



UNREASONABLE DEVIATION HELD TO VITIATE
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROVISION IN
CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT
Plaintiffs sought to recover $16,794.25 from defendant because of
damage to eight cases of automobiles which were carried on defendant's
ship from New York to 'Guam. Although the bill of lading called for ship-
ment below deck,1 the automobiles were stowed on the vessel's deck and
suffered sea water damage. Both parties were in agreement that the stor-
age of the cargo on deck constituted an unreasonable deviation, but de-
fendant asserted that its liability was limited to $500 for each case of auto-
mobiles by the clause in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 2 which provides
that "in any event" the carrier's liability for damage to cargo shall be
limited to $500 per package unless, a higher value is declared by the
shipper and inserted in the bill of lading.8 However, the court held that
an unreasonable deviation deprives the carrier of the benefit of this pro-
vision of the Act and subjects him to complete liability for damage to
the cargo. Jones v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
The term "deviation" was originally, and is still generally, thought to
mean the straying of a ship from the course of its voyage.4 However,
deviation has not been restricted to the geographical wandering of the
vessel; for the doctrine has been applied in cases in which there has been
an unnecessary delay in carrying the cargo 5 and in cases in which the cargo
1. The autombiles were shipped under a "clean" bill of lading which requires
that the cargo be stowed below deck. The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579 (U.S. 1871);
The St. Johns N.F., 280 Fed. 553, 555 (2d Cir. 1922), aff'd sub orm. St. Johns N.F.
Shipping Corp. v. Campanhia Geral Commercial, 263 U.S. 119 (1923).
2. 49 STAT. 1207 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1946).
3. "Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for
any loss or damage to or in connection with the transportation of goods in an
amount exceeding $500 per package . . .unless the nature and value of such
goods have been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill
of lading ...
"By agreement between the carrier . . . and the shipper another maximum
amount than that mentioned in this paragraph may be fixed: Provided, That such
maximum shall not be less than the figure above named. In no event shall the car-
rier be liable for more than the amount of damage actually sustained!' 49 STAT.
1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1946).
4. See Sheldon & Co. v. Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-
Gesellschaft, 28 F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1928). For a general discussion of the
doctrine of deviation, see KNAUTH, OCEAN BILLs OF LADING 240 (4th ed. 1953);
Deutsch, Deviation Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 21 ORe. L. REv. 365
(1942).
5. E.g., United States v. Middleton, 3 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1924), cert. denied,
267 U.S. 603 (1925) ; The Iossifoglu, 32 F.2d 928 (D. Md. 1929).
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has been stored on the deck of the ship without the consent of the shipper.8
The effect of deviation has been to void the contract between the shipper
and the carrier 7 and to deprive the carrier of the benefit of any exemption
or limitation contained in the bill of lading.8 The rationale underlying
this doctrine is that whenever there is a deviation the vessel is on a voyage
different from the one contracted for by the shipper and carrier, with the
result that the contract between the parties has been breached and can no
longer be given effect. 9 Prior to the passage of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act, the Harter Act 10 controlled shipments made by water in both
domestic and foreign commerce. The Harter Act contains no clause similar
to the one in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act which limits the liability
of the carrier to $500 per package.:1 But it was the practice of shipowners
under the Harter Act to place a clause in the bill of lading which limited
their liability on the cargo which they were transporting. 12 Such a clause,
however, was of no effect if the carrier was guilty of a deviation because
the entire bill of lading was deemed to be vitiated due to the change in
risk from that originally contemplated by the shipper. 13
Although the effect of deviation on the limitation of liability clause
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act has not previously been presented
to the courts,14 cases have been decided which involved the effect of devia-
tion on other statutory provisions, which, like the limitation clause, contain
6. St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. Campanhia Geral Commercial, 263 U.S.
119 (1923); The Sarnia, 278 Fed. 459 (2d Cir. 1921).
7. Farr v. Hain S.S. Co., 121 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1941).
8. See Sheldon & Co. v. Hamburg Amerikanische Packetfahrt-Actien-
Gesellscbaft, 28 F.2d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 1928).
9. The St. Johns N.F., 280 Fed. 553, 556 (2d Cir. 1922), Tff'd sub nom. St.
Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. Campanhia Geral Commercial, 263 U.S. 119 (1923).
10. 27 STAT. 445 (1893), 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1946). Since the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act applies only to shipments made in foreign commerce, the Harter
Act still is in effect so far as shipments made in domestic commerce are concerned;
but a bill of lading for the transportation of goods in domestic commerce is subject
to the provisions of the Carriag- of Goods by Sea Act if the bill contains a clause
stating that it shall be subject to this Act. In the instant case, since the shipment
was made to a possession of the 'United States, such a provision was placed in the
bill of lading in order to subject it to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. For a
comparison of the Harter and Carriage of Goods by Sea Acts, see Note, 27 VA.
L. REv. 1078 (1941).
11. It has been suggested that the Harter Act be amended to include such a
provision. See KNAuTH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 163n.
12. See RoaINsox, ADnmnzATY §76 (1939).
13. St. Johns N.F. Shipping Corp. v. Campanhia Geral Commercial, 263 U.S.
119 (1923); The Sarnia, 278 Fed. 459 (2d Cir. 1921).
14. However, there are dicta which support the view taken by the instant court
that an unreasonable deviation deprives the carrier of the benefit of the limitation
of liability clause. See Petition of Isbrandsten Co., 201 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir.
1953) ; Givaudan Delawanna, Inc. v. The Blijdendijk, 91 F. Supp. 663, 667 (S.D.N.Y.
1950). It should also be noted that the limitation clause in the English Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 1924, 14 & 15 GEo. 5, c. 22, which is almost identical to the
limitation clause in the United States Act, has been interpreted as being removed by
an unreasonable deviation. See Stag Line, Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango & Co., [1932]
A.C. 328, 340, 346.
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no language making them inoperative in case of a deviation. In The
Pelotas'5 the court held that the owner of a deviating vessel loses the
benefit of the Limitation of Liability Statute, which limits the liability of
a shipowner for damages to cargo to his interest in the vessel and the
freight receipts. 16 On the other hand, it has been held that, despite devia-
tion, the Fire Statute 17 will protect a shipowner from liability for uninten-
tionally and nonnegligently caused fires where there is no causal connection
between the deviation and the damage to the cargo.' 8 Two courts 19 have
held that a deviating carrier retains the benefit of the provision in the Car-
riage of Goods by Sea Act which discharges the carrier from all liability
unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date
on which the goods should have been delivered.I
Where actual value of the goods is not declared, the limitation of lia-
bility clause of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act would seem to indicate
that the liability of a carrier could never exceed $500 for each package be-
cause it states that the carrier shall not be liable "in any event" for an
amount exceeding $500 per package. It could be maintained that had
Congress intended the limitation clause not to apply to a case in which
there was a deviation, it would not have used the phrase "in any event,"
but would have worded the provision so as to make it apply in any case
except one involving a deviation. However, since § 4(4) of the Act 2 '
provides that a reasonable deviation 22 is not to be construed as a breach of
the Act, it would seem logical to infer that an unreasonable deviation does
breach the Statute and render its provisions, including the $500 limitation
clause, inoperative. Moreover, although the passage of the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act represented both a compromise between cargo
and carrier interests 3 and an expression of the need for inter-
15. 66 F.2d.75 (5th Cir. 1933).
16. REv. STAT. §4283 (1875), as amended, 49 STAT. 960 (1935), 49 STAT. 1479
(1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183 (1946). Both the Harter Act and the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act expressly state that they do not change the rights and obligations of
carriers under the Limitation of Liability Statute. Where there is no deviation,
it would be possible for the carrier's liability to be limited to an amount which is
less than the $500 per package limitation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act if the
shipowner's interest in the ship and the freight were less than $500 per package.
17. REv. STAT. §4282 (1875), 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1946). This provision, like
the Limitation of Liability Statute, supra note 16, has not been repealed or amended
by the Harter Act or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
18. The Ida, 75 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1935) ; cf. Hoskyn & Co. v. Silver Line, Ltd.,
63 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 143 F.2d 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323
U.S. 767 (1944).
19. Potter v. North German Lloyd, 50 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Cal. 1943); Singer
Hosiery Mills of N.Y., Inc. v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 199 Misc. 389, 102 N.Y.S.2d
762 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1951).
20. 49 STAT. 1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1946).
21. 49 STAT. 1209 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §1304(4) (1946).
22. On what is a reasonable deviation, see 48 L.Q. RrV. 151 (1924); 21 VA.
L. REv. 227 (1934).
23. See SEN. REP. No. 742, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 4 (1935).
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national uniformity in bills of lading,24 the purpose of the $500
limitation clause was to benefit the cargo owners by preventing the
carriers from continuing the prevalent practice of limiting their lia-
bility for each package to $100 or less.25 It is true that, under the
Act, the shipper, by declaring the actual value of the goods shipped, may
impose upon the carrier a liability covering the full value of the cargo;
but, in such a case, the shipper must pay a much higher freight rate to the
carrier.26 The slight chance that damage may result from an unreasonable
deviation may not warrant in the mind of the shipper this increased cost.
Normally, he will already have paid for insurance to cover the ordinary
risks which may be incurred during an ocean voyage. However, the
usual cargo policy does not cover loss resulting from an unreasonable
deviation of the carrier unless an extra premium is paid by the shipper.
27
In effect, this means that if the statutory $500 limitation provision is per-
mitted to stand, despite an unreasonable deviation, the shipper will either
have to pay an extra freight charge or an additional insurance premium
in order to cover loss resulting from a possible unreasonable deviation.
It would seem more equitable to place on the carrier the risk of an un-
reasonable deviation, which, since it involves a standard of fault, is an
occurrence he can prevent.
The fact that the limitation of liability is embodied in the statute rather
than in the bill of lading ought to make no difference, since, in either
case, the risk of an unreasonable deviation is one which the carrier can
more easily guard against than can the shipper. The cases, 28 which hold
that the statutory provision, limiting the time for bringing suit, is not
affected by deviation, are distinguishable. While a deviation by on-deck
carriage does materially increase the risk of damage to the cargo, no type
of deviation affects the time within which the shipper will have to bring suit.
The instant case may also be distinguished from The Ida,29 which held that
deviation does not affect the protection afforded the carrier by the Fire Stat-
ute, because the deviation in The Ida had no causal connection with the
damage resulting from fire, while the on-deck storage of the cargo in the
instant case was admittedly the cause of the damage which resulted.
30
Therefore, it would seem that if an unreasonable deviation occurs which has
no causal connection with the damage to the cargo, the limitation of liability
24. See H.R. REP. No. 2218, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). At the time of
the passage of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, twenty-four other countries had
passed similar statutes. Ibid.
25. See Hearings before Committee on Commerce on S. 1152, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 32, 47 (1935).
26. For example, in the instant case, the shipper could have declared the full
value of the automobiles and paid the additional 5% ad valorem freight rate. [Brief
for Claimant-Respondents, p. 18].
27. See KNAUTH, op. cit. supra note 4, at 246.
28. See cases cited note 19 supra.
29. 75 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1935).
30. Instant case at 387.
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per package provision should not be affected by the deviation; and, conse-
quently, the shipper would be limited to a recovery of $500 per package
unless he declared a higher valuation before the time of shipment. How-
ever, where, as in the instant case, there is a causal connection between the
unreasonable deviation and the damage, the limitation clause should be de-
clared inoperative and the carrier held accountable for the full amount of
the loss.
Conflict of Laws-
LAW OF DOMICILE OF PLAINTIFF APPLIED IN
ACTION FOR MULTI-STATE DEFAMATION
Plaintiff brought an action against a business competitor and Time,
Inc., alleging that defendants caused a defamatory article to be published
in Life magazine and the Readers Digest and to be broadcast over radio
station WOR. The plaintiff was a Connecticut corporation doing business
in five Northeastern and Middle Atlantic states and defendants were New
York corporations. The publications were distributed nationally and the
radio broadcast was heard on the East coast. On a motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a claim, the court held that the law of plain-
tiff's domicile should be applied in a case of multi-state libel which has
been communicated in the domiciliary state as well as in other juris-
dictions.1 Dale System, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn.
1953) .2
Originally an action for libel raised no difficult conflict of laws prob-
lems since circulation of the defamatory matter took place in a relatively
small geographical area to a limited number of persons. Thus for both
substantive and conflict of laws purposes a rule was applied which viewed
each individual distribution of the libel as a different publication for which
a separate cause of action arose.3 However, with the growth of media of
mass communication which gives circulation through many states this
rule presented the injured party with difficulties of pleading and proof
and the publisher with possible indefinite tolling of statutes of limitations.
1. The instant case evidently requires that there be some communication of the
defamation within the domiciliary state, but the extent of the communication ap-
parently need not be extensive. See instant case at 530. Two subsequent cases in
which the same judge again stated the rule shed no light on this problem. See
Fouts v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 535, 537 (D. Conn. 1953);
Hazlett v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 538, 539, 541-2 (D. Conn. 1953).
2. After ruling on the conflict of laws problem, the court held that the plaintiff
had no complaint sounding in defamation but did have a valid complaint on an allega-
tion of unfair competition by injurious falsehood. Instant case at 532, 534.
3. ODGERS, LIBEL AND SLANDER 132-3, 139 (6th ed. 1929) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§578, comment b (1938); Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MIcH. L. RZv. 959,
961 (1953); cf. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 3 Pick. 304, 311 (Mass. 1826). See
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS §92 (3d ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF
LAWS §§377, 378 (1934).
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Furthermore, the multiple publication rule did not solve the problem of
what law should be applied in an action for libel circulated in many states.
Faced with these problems many states as a part of substantive tort law
evolved the single publication rule which allows a general allegation of
the circulation of the defamatory matter and requires recovery in one action
for all the damage done to the plaintiff within the jurisdiction.4 This rule,
however, has not been extended beyond state lines5 to achieve a consistent
resolution of the problem of what law to apply when a court is faced with
a case of multi-state libel where a number of jurisdictions and a variety of
substantive rules are involved.6 When faced with the problem some courts
have failed to consider it. 7 Others have sought to choose the applicable
law by reference to one particular event, such as the place of first impact,8
as determinative of liability. Liability has also been based on the law of
the place of the greatest damage to the plaintiff,9 which has sometimes been
ascertained by determining in what jurisdiction the plaintiff appears to
have had his dominant contacts. 10 Finally, there has been an attempt in
some cases to adhere to the common law rule and allow recovery on the
law of each jurisdiction in which publication occurred."1 But the significant
features of the judicial treatment of the problem have been the failure of
4. Prosser, supra note 3, at 962-3; Note, 62 HARV. L. REv. 1041, 1042 (1949).
5. Prosser, supra note 3, at 964. See Hartman v. Time, Inc., 166 F2d 127
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948) (single publication rule applied within
the state of the forum but a multiple publication conflict of laws rule applied);
Comment, 61 H.Av. L. Rav. 1460 (1948). When there is no substantive difference
between jurisdictions the problem in the instant case does not arise. See Leverton
v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F2d 974, 975 (3d Cir. 1951); Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier
Pub. Co., 161 F2d 333, 335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947). For a
discussion of the differences in the substantive law see Prosser, supra note 3, at
978-92.
6. The analytical process here involved is one of characterization-the initial
problem of determining, for conflict of laws purposes, in what major field of law the
particular facts in question fall. See CHEATHAM, GooDRIcH, GiuswOLD, RasE,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 391-4 (3d ed. 1951); Note, 48 COL.
L. Ray. 932, 934-5 (1948). In the instant case the court characterized the action
as being for three single unified torts: the article in Life magazine, the article in the
Readers Digest, and the broadcast over WOR. Instant case at 529.
7. See Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Brinkley v. Fishbein,
110 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1940); Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D.
Wash. 1943), appeal dismissed, 144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944); cf. Brayton v.
Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 205 F.2d 644, 646 (2d Cir. 1953) (both parties assumed
that New York law applied and therefore no need to consider the problem on
appeal).
8. Hartman v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 135 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334
U.S. 838 (1948) ; Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 354 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
9. Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 858 (1949); Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., 161 F.2d 333 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
10. Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); see Neiman-Marcus Co. v. Lait, 107 F. Supp. 96, 99-100 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Kelly v. Loews, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 482-3 (D. Mass. 1948).
11. Hartman v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 838
(1948) ; Howser v. Pearson, 95 F. Supp., 936 (D.D.C. 1951) ; O'Reilly v. Curtis
Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940). Other classifications of the possible
factors in making a choice of law are made in Leflar, Choice of Law: Torts:
Current Trends, 6 VAND. L. REv. 447, 454-7 (1952) ; Prosser, supra note 3, at 971-8;
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the courts adequately to consider the problem and the failure to arrive at a
single, workable rule.
By applying the law of one jurisdiction to claims arising from an
alleged multi-state libel not only is the task of the trial court greatly simpli-
fied, but a more workable means is provided whereby the injured party
can recover in one action for the entire injury. Moreover, since the extent
of the circulation in all states would appear to be an element in determining
damages, 12 the deterrent effect of the libel action will not be materially
reduced. The court does not indicate whether the plaintiff is required to
claim for all damages in one action. In so far as the libel is viewed as
one composite national tort it is arguable that recovery in one action would
be res judicata on all subsequent actions. 13 However, the court may have
limited its decision to actions in which the injured party is claiming for all
his damages. If recovery would be sought only for the damage done in a
particular jurisdiction the court may continue to apply the traditional rule
that the damage done in each state is a separate cause of action. 14 Thus
the possibility of harassment by the litigious plaintiff is not obviated.1
In making the selection of the controlling law a number of considera-
tions are significant, the primary ones being the desire for a reasonable
connection between the governing law and the place of the injury, ease
of application, predictability to enable a publisher to avoid defamation by
self-imposed censorship, and prevention of either party's ability to choose
the applicable law.16 Insofar as domicile is normally the place of principal
contacts of either a corporation or an individual, the rule of the instant
case is most nearly in accord with the traditional rule that the law of the
place of injury is the law to be applied.17 But the rule becomes more
arbitrary when applied to cases in which the principal circulation is in some
jurisdiction other than that of the domicile.' 8 Moreover, although a rule
related to domicile would appear to be easy to apply in the case of cor-
Note, 60 HAv. L. Rlv. 941, 943-50 (1947); Note, 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1006, 1010
(1953) ; Note, 14 OHio ST. IJ. 96, 98-101 (1953) ; Note,.35 VA. L. REv. 627, 632-6
(1949). See Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy,
32 MINx. L. REv. 734, 760-2 (1948). The classifications developed there were ap-
plied in Dale System, Inc. v. General Teleradio, Inc., supra note 10.
12. The instant case does not reach the question of damages. However, for the
rule evolved in the case to be of any effect in allowing recovery in one action for all
damages, the extent of the national circulation would be important. See Note, 28
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1006, 1010 (1953).
13. See Kelly v. Loews, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473, 482-3 (D. Mass. 1948) where
it was suggested that, although damages were sought only for a local showing of a
movie, it was part of a composite national tort.
14. O'Reilly v. Curtis Pub. Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940). See Prosser,
supra note 3, at 965; Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 627, 631 (1949).
15. E.g., Hartman v. Time, Inc., 166 F.2d 127, 136 and n.13 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 334 U.S. 838 (1948) (six different actions brought).
16. For a collection and analysis of the many possible solutions see Prosser,
supra note 3, at 971-8; Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 941, 943-51 (1947); Note, 35 VA.
L. REv. 627, 632-637 (1949).
17. GOODIcH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 92.
18. In the instant case if the plaintiff had been a Delaware corporation Delaware
law would be applied although the plaintiff transacted no business in that state.
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porations, where domicile is the state of incorporation, 9 its manageability
becomes more difficult where an individual, who may have significant con-
tacts in several states, is involved.20 It also will be difficult for a publisher
to ascertain whether material is defamatory prior to publication; but the
uncertainty resulting from the possibility of separate actions in different
jurisdictions may render this predictability factor of little importance until
that possibility is eliminated. Hence, perhaps the primary advantage of
the court's ruling lies in its prevention of forum shopping by either party,
as it is unlikely that a plaintiff corporation will consider the contingency
of a future libel suit at the time of its incorporation. Despite largely de-
structive treatment by legal writers, the court in the instant case has
made a reasoned attempt to apply a rule which satisfies many of the impor-
tant considerations in the area. In the absence of a uniform statute 21 or
uniform substantive rules 2 2 the decision seems a valid attempt to arrive
at a workable solution of a confused problem.
Constitutional Law-
SUBMERGED LANDS ACT A VALID EXERCISE,
OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
Alabama and Rhode Island filed with the Supreme Court motions for
leave to file bills of complaint to contest the constitutionality of the grants
by the Federal Government to the defendant states provided by the Sub-
merged Lands Act of 1953.' By this Act the seaward boundaries of
coastal states were confirmed and established at either a three-geographic-
mile or a three-marine-league limit from their coastlines, 2 and the title,
rights, and interests of the United States to the lands beneath these waters,
and the resources within such lands and waters, were granted to the coastal
states.3 The Supreme Court, in a per curiam decision,4 denied the motions
of the complainant states, holding that the power of Congress to dispose
19. Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 172 Mass. 154, 51 N.E. 531
(1898); see RESTATEMENT, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 41 (1934).
20. Compare In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 Ati. 601 (Prerog.
Ct. 1934), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 Atl. 743, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936),
with In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932), cert. denied, 288
U.S. 617 (1933). Domicile is a concept used for a variety of purposes in the law.
See CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CoNFLIct OF LAWS 195
(1942). It has been suggested that it does not have a single meaning for all these
purposes. 3 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS 226, et seq. (1925); CooK,
op. cit. supra, at 194-210.
21. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 993-5. Federal legislation has also been
suggested. Id. at 995-996.
22. See Note, 60 HARV. L. REv. 941, 951-2 (1947).
1. 67 STAT. 29, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-3, 1311-15 (Supp. 1953).
2. Sections 2(b), 4, 67 STAT. 29, 31, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301(b), § 1312 (Supp.
1953).
3. Section 3(a) (b), 67 STAT. 30, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (b) (Supp. 1953).
4. Concurring opinion by Justice Reed; dissenting opinions by Justices Black
and Douglas.
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of Government property under the Property Clause 5 is unlimited and pre-
cludes judicial review. Alabama v. Texas, 74 Sup. Ct. 481 (1954) ; Rhode
Island v. Louisiana, 74 Sup. Ct. 481 (1954), rehearing denied, 22 U.S.L.
WEEK, 3284 (U.S. April 27, 1954).
These cases stem from United States v. California 6 where, although
admittedy it had previously used language indicating the contrary,7 the
Supreme Court held: that the thirteen original states did not have title
to off-shore areas within a three-mile limit at the time of the Revolution,
and, therefore, California could not have such title because it was admitted
on an equal footing with them; that the Federal Government is possessed
of paramount rights in these areas. The Court reached the same result in
United States v. Louisiana,8 holding that Louisiana had no "better footing"
than California with respect to her claims of ownership of off-shore areas.
In United States v. Texas,9 the Court, assuming that the Republic of Texas
had rights of ownership in off-shore areas, held that the "equal footing"
clause 10 had the effect of taking this property right from the State of Texas
when it entered the Union and putting it into the Federal Government.
From this trio of Supreme Court decisions a bitterly contested political con-
troversy " developed which reached culmination in the enactment of the
Submerged Lands Act. The foremost prize at stake was the valuable oil
deposit known to exist in these off-shore areas; '2 the issue was whether the
Federal Government or individual coastal states were to receive the income
from the exploitation of these resources. The political victory gained by the
individual states was upheld by the instant cases.
The terse opinion of the Court determined, in effect, three distinct
questions, each necessary to the holding: whether the United States had
property rights in the lands and resources included in the Act; whether
such rights constituted property within the meaning of the Property Clause;
and whether the construction that has been engrafted onto the Property
Clause by previous cases, i.e., that the power of Congress is unlimited,
controls these cases. On the first question it was contended 13 that,
5. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2: "The Congress shall have power to dispose
of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States ..
6. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
7. Id. at 36.
8. 339 U.S. 699 (1950)."
9. 339 U.S. 707 (1950).
10. The "equal footing" clause represents the Court's interpretation of Article
IV, Section 3, clause 2 of the Constitution: "New states may be admitted by the
Congress into the Union." Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) ; see Skiriotes
v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941). Equal footing language appears in the acts or
joint resolutions admitting new states into the Union since 1796. See Coyle v.
Oklahoma, supra at 567; e.g., 2 STAT. 701 (1812); 3 STAT. 429 (1819); 5 STAT.
742, 797 (1845) ; 9 STAT. 452 (1850).
11. See e.g., BARTLE= , THE TMELANDS On. CoNTRovERsY 213-81 (1953); SEN.
REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-3 (1953) (Part II, Minority Report).
12. See SEN. REP. No. 133, supra note 11, at 5-9, 62-3.
13. See Brief for Complainant, pp. 20, 26, 28, Rhode Island v. Louisiana, 74
Sup. Ct. 471 (1954) ; H.R. REP. No. 215, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1953). Compare
SEN. REP. No. 1592, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1948), reprinted'in SEN. REP. No.
133, supra note 11, at 57.
1954]
806 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 102
although California had held that the Government possessed "paramount
rights," the Court never stated that the Government had property rights to
the areas; that the California decree issued by the Court 14 omitted the
words "of proprietorship" as had been requested by the Government; 15
and that one of the dissents expressed the view that title had not been estab-
lished in the Federal Government. 16 However, the California holding also
declared that "an incident to . . . [paramount rights] is full dominion,"'
1
and clearly, "full dominion" includes ownership.' 8
The primary argument 19 on the second question is founded on lan-
guage in Texas which states that property rights in off-shore areas are
coalesced with political rights; 20 therefore, it is argued, something more
than property rights is involved, and hence the Property Clause is inap-
plicable.2 ' But, assuming that an integrated combination of property and
political rights would render the Property Clause inapplicable, the Texas
14. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 804 (1947).
15. See H.R. REP. No. 215, supra note 13 at 117 n.5; BARmY, THE TIDELANDS
On. CONTROVERSY 190-4 (1953). Two other reasons suggest themselves as to why
the Court struck out "of proprietorship" from the decree: (1) the words were
surplusage; see BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY 193 (1953) ; (2) as the
words "of proprietorship" modified "paramount rights," the Court was probably
fearful that the complete phrase might later be construed to be a limitation on the
rights of the Government.
16. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 43, 45 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). However, Justice Frankfurter did not contend that there could be no
title in the Federal Government, but only that this fact was not established by the
arguments presented in that case. In fact, he recognized that the Court's holding
could be interpreted to include a proprietary interest in the Federal Government.
Id. at 45.
17. Id. at 38-9.
18. See concurring opinion of Justice Reed, instant cases at 482; statement
of then Attorney General Clark, BARTLEY, THE TIDELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY 193 and
n.34 (1953). Perhaps realizing its exceedingly tenuous character, one of the com-
plainants abandoned this argument completely. See Reply Brief for Complainant,
p.7 n.4, Rhode Island v. Louisiana, 74 Sup. Ct. 481 (1954).
19. Another argument on this question attempted to establish as an historical fact
the intent of the Founding Fathers to limit the purpose of the Property Clause
to the disposition of the Northwest Territory. Although it is conceded that such a
narrow construction could not be tolerated, it was argued that the restrictive intent
of the Clause should be retained in that only property which is similar to that of
the Northwest Territory, i.e., "property in the conventional sense of that term," is
includible. See Brief for Complainant, pp. 20-7, supra note 13. This argument
seems unfounded, and neither dissenting opinion mentioned it. It not only raises
the question of why the terminology "Territory or other Property" was included in
the clause, but also the issue of what is meant by "property in the conventional
sense."
20. "... once low-water mark is passed the international domain is reached.
Property rights must then be so subordinated to political rights as in substance
to coalesce and unite in the national sovereign." United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707, 719 (1950).
21. See Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to File Complaint and Com-
plaint, p. 42, Alabama v. Texas, 74 Sup. Ct. 481 (1954) ; dissenting opinion of
Justice Douglas, instant cases at 486; SENr. REP. No. 133, supra note 11, at 12-13;
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 1, Committee on Judiciary on HR. 2948 and
Similar Bills, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 219-26 (1953). Compare Brief for Complainant,
p. 27, supra note 13; H.R. REP. No. 215, .mtpra note 13, at 118.
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case does not support the existence in the instant cases of such a combina-
tion. The "coalesce" language is dictum whereas the holding states merely
that property rights are "so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to
follow sovereignty." 22  In addition, the Court held only that "this is an
instance" where these property rights are so subordinated, i.e. when Texas
was admitted to the Union; therefore Texas is not authority for the prop-
osition that property rights, once established in the Federal Government,
continue so subordinated to political rights. Moreover, since the constitu-
tional powers of the Federal Government remain undiminished by the
Act,2 there is no reason why the property interests should not be consid-
ered separately 24 and subject to proper congressional action under the
Property Clause.
As to the final question, recognizing that the Act transferred property
subject to the Property Clause, it cannot be said that the cases cited by the
Court,25 which interpret the scope of congressional power under the Prop-
erty Clause to be unlimited, are necessarily controlling. Of the six cases 26
mentioned in the opinion, only five deal with situations relating to the use
and disposition of Government property; 27 the property involved in these
five cases was wholly within the land boundaries of the Nation, involving
only domestic issues and controversies. 2 But here the property has inter-
22. The holding of the Court is: "We hold that as an incident to the transfer
of that sovereignty any claim that Texas may have had to the marginal sea was
relinquished to the United States. . . . And so although dominium and imperurn
are normally separable and separate, this is an instance where property interests
are so subordinated to the rights of sovereignty as to follow sovereignty." United
States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 718-9 (1950).
23. See Submerged Lands Act, supra note 2, §6, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1314 (Supp.
1953), which is declaratory of the Constitutional rights retained by the Federal
Government; concurring opinion of Justice Reed, instant cases at 482. The clearest
expression of this principle is by Attorney General Brownell: ". . . in our opinion
the Federal Government would be retaining its paramount rights to the extent
defined in the Supreme Court decision [California case], because it would have
full navigation rights, full powers of national defense, full rights to deal with that
property in all matters affecting international relations or foreign affairs." Hearings,
supra note 21, at 224. In the dissenting opinions, Justice Black feels that the
failure of the Court to impose a construction on the Act might in effect impair the
power of the Government, instant cases at 483, and Justice Douglas considers the
Act an abdication of Federal paramount authority. Instant cases at 486.
24. As pointed out in Justice Douglas' dissent, instant cases at 486, this "separa-
tion" argument was rejected in the Texas case, 339 U.S. at 719. But there the
Court decided a different issue than that presented by the instant cases. See text
at note 9, text following note 22, and see note 22 supra.
25. United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526 (U.S. 1840); United States v. Mid-
west Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16
(1940); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
26. The citation from United States v. Midwest Oil Co., supra note 25, in-
cluded Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897) and Light v. United States,
220 U.S. 523 (1911).
27. The issue in the California case was to determine what rights the Federal
Government had in these areas, not the disposition of these rights. See text follow-
ing notes 6 and 13 supra.
28. United States v. Gratiot, supra note 25 (lead mines in Illinois and Wis-
consin) ; Camfield v. United States, supra note 26 (rangelands in Colorado) ; Light
v. United States, supra note 26 (forest and rangelands in Colorado) ; United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., supra note 25 (oil lands in California); United States v. San
Francisco, supra note 25 (land- and rights-of-way in California).
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national attributes, and a distinction based upon the nature and location of
the property has been previously made.29 This distinction is significant be-
cause existing, concepts of constitutional law recognize the executive branch
as the exclusive governmental agency responsible for the conduct of foreign
affairs.8 0 As was pointed out in California"' and repeated in Texas,3"
these very lands may be the subject of future international agreement.
Strict adherence to the "unlimited power" doctrine which the Court affirms
would dictate the result that Congress and not the President would be-
come the spokesman with whom foreign governments would have to deal
regarding agreements, problems, or controversies concerning the use and
ownership of off-shore areas and resources. But this is constitutionally
impossible as that responsibility is the President's.
By the above analysisas the Court could have validly distinguished the
authorities which it held binding, and then have proceeded to consider the
cases on their merits,34 perhaps limiting Congress' power to dispose of
the areas in issue. But even though the ultimate result might have been
the same, the Court would have performed a service if it had clearly defined
the rights and relationship of both state and federal governments in the
areas included in the Act.35 The uncertainties remaining due to the sum-
mary nature of the opinion are an invitation to litigation, 6 or even attempts
at new legislation,37 which might act to delay and impede the exploitation
of resources vital to the economy and defense of the nation.
29. In the California case, the Court distinguished the apparently controlling case
of Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (U.S. 1845) strictly on the grounds
that the Pollard case dealt with inland waters and not ocean waters. See United
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 30-1, 36-8 (1947).
30. U.S. CoNsT. Art. II, §2, cl. 2; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The Submerged Lands Act provides only that "The
United States retains all its . . . control of said lands . . . for the constitutional
purposes of . . . international affairs . . . " it does not provide which branch of
the Federal Government is to exercise this control. Section 6(a), 67 STAT. 32,
43 U.S.C.A. § 1314 (Supp. 1953).
31. 332 U.S. at 35.
32. 339 U.S. at 718.
33. The briefs of the complainants did not contain the argument that the cases
enunciating the "unlimited power" doctrine could be distinguished because of the
nature and location of the property.
34. It was also argued that the power of Congress to dispose of these areas
under the Submerged Lands Act should be held invalid as a violation of right of the
complainant states to be treated on "equal footing" with the defendant states, that
Congress violated its duty to hold these areas in trust for all the inhabitants of the
Nation, and that the property rights, although within the scope of the Property
Clause, are a non-delegable attribute of national sovereignty.
35. See Justice Black's dissenting opinion, instant cases at 483.
36. Id. at 485.
37. The question of whether a subsequent Congress could repeal any or all of
the property grants made by the Act was asked of Attorney General Brownell. Al-
though he stated that such a course would be impractical, he refused to give his
opinion on whether this could accomplished. See Hearings, supra note 21, at 230-1.
RECENT CASES
Federal Tort Claims Act-,
UNITED STATES DENIED RIGHT TO INDEMNITY
AGAINST NEGLIGENT EMPLOYEE
A motorist sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 1
for injuries sustained in a collision with a government car. The United
States was granted leave to implead the employee as a third-party defendant
over his objection. 2 Judgment was rendered against the United States
based solely on the negligence of its driver acting within the scope of his
employment, and in favor of the United States against the employee in
accordance with the common law doctrine of indemnity. The latter judg-
ment was reversed by the circuit court, which held that, since § 2676 of the
Act terminates the employee's liability to the claimant as soon as judgment
is rendered against the United States,3 subsequent payment by the Govern-
ment does not constitute satisfaction of any obligation of the employee.
Gilnan v. United States, 206 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1953) (Harrison, D.J.,
dissenting), cert. granted, 98 Sup. Ct. 173 (1953).
A private employer who satisfies a judgment against him purely on
the ground of respondeat superior is entitled to judgment for a like amount
against the negligent servant,4 and the employee may often be impleaded
in the original suit.5 Recovery is granted on a theory of quasi-contract
to avoid unjust enrichment: the employer ". . . has paid moneys which
in equity and good conscience the person actually guilty of negligence ought
to pay." 6 A government employee bears initially the same primary lia-
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-80 (Supp. 1949).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
3. "The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of this title shall constitute
a complete bar to any action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee of the government whose act or omission gave rise to the
claim." 28 U.S.C. § 2676 (Supp. 1949).
4. See cases cited Note, 63 YALE LJ. 570 n.3 (1954); 3 MooRE, FEDEFRAL
PRACTICE 514 (2d ed. 1948); PROSSER, TORTS 1114 (1941); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY
§ 401, comment c (1933) ; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 130, 146 (1932).
5. Fedden v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 204 App. Div. 741, 199 N.Y.
Supp. 9 (1923); see CLARK, CODE PLEADING 412 (2d ed. 1947); RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 399, comment h (1933). This necessitates modification of orthodox theory
that the right to indemnity accrues only upon satisfaction of the primary judgment
by the employer. However, the cases which express that doctrine evidence no pur-
pose other than assuring that the employer will not recover more than he expends.
Where the tort and indemnity judgments are rendered in the same case under an
impleader procedure, execution by the employer can be stayed pending satisfaction
by him of the judgment in favor of the original plaintiff. Burris v. American
Chicle Co., 120 F.2d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1941).
6. Instant case at 847. See note 4 supra and RESTATEMENT, REsTrrUTIoN § 75,
at 330 (1936). An alternate theory expressed by Cardozo, J., in Schubert v.
Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928), is that the employer's
right to indemnity arises from an independent duty of the servant to him. This
seems limited almost entirely to dicta in cases involving suits against the employer
by an injured party who could not have sued the employee because of an immunity
arising from their relationship of husband-wife, parent-child, or the like. These
courts deemed quasi-contract theory inadequate because the employee had never been
liable to the injured person. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 570, 576 (1954).
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bility as a private employee.7 Originally, the injured person's only remedy
against the United States was through a private claim bill in Congress, s
but by enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 the United
States surrendered its sovereign immunity from vicarious liability for the
torts of its servants. As a concomitant of the new liability, two district
court decisions 9 have accorded the Government the normal right of an
employer to indemnity. In those states which waive immunity to suit for
torts by their employees, there seems to be no litigation on indemnity
rights.
1 0
The language of the Act does not treat the question of indemnity.
Nor does the reasoning of the court, that § 2676 of the Act eliminates the
employee's liability before the Government pays," remove the logical basis
for recovery by quasi-contract, since imposition of the legal detriment of
judgment upon the Government is directly attributable to the wrongdoing
of the servant and is the means whereby he has secured immunity from
the injured person's claims. Section 2676 probably was prompted by other
considerations, since it affords substantial protection from suit to the em-
ployee and curbs multiple actions. Likewise, it spares the Government
part of the expense of its frequent practice of handling the defense for
employees sued individually as a result of conduct in the course of em-
ployment.
12
The legislative history also fails to yield a clear-cut answer.' 3 A pur-
pose of placing the burden of legal liability on the United States alone
"within limits," while subjecting federal workers to only routine dis-
ciplinary measures such as suspension or discharge, was expressed in two
places, but only with reference to a section not involved here which released
the employee from any liability to a claimant who accepted an administrative
award not exceeding $1,000.14  In both instances, the bill discussed also
7. Bomberger v. International Freighting Corp., 92 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.
1950); accord, Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937). See 56 YALE L.J. 534, 544-5
(1947).
8. See SEN. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1942); 56 YALE L.J. 534
(1947).
9. Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953); United States
v. Lushbough, Hoffman v. Lushbough (unreported decision, D.S.D.), re''d on other
grounds, 200 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1952).
10. California provides for reimbursement by subrogating itself to the rights
of the person injured. CAL. VExcLE CODE ANN. §400 (1948).
11. See note 3 supra for the text of § 2676.
12. See Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R.
6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1942).
13. The committee reports in 1946 are of no assistance on the problem. The
principal source of information is the legislative history of S. 2221, passed by the
Senate in 1942, and H.R. 6463, which was approved in substance by the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary but not considered by the full House. The Supreme Court
relied heavily on the 1942 material in an important case, Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 25-30, n. 9-21 (1953), and commentators have treated it as authoritative.
See, e.g., Gottlieb, Some Aspects of Contribution and Indemnity in Tort Actions
Against the United States, 9 FFD. B.J. 391 (1948) ; 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
14. The provision was included in the Act of 1946. 28 U.S.C. §2672 (Supp.
1949). The first enlightening statement, is found in SEN. REP. No. 1196, 77th Cong.,
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contained a section on judgments by suit which the legislative reports
o analyzed with equally comprehensive explanatory notes. These notes con-
tain no similar declarations of intent to laden the Government with the
whole cost, thus making questionable any inferences of that intent as to
payments pursuant to judgment, which are not limited in amount to
$1,000.15 The better conclusion is that the legislative history of the Act
does not manifest any intent whatsoever on the right of the Government
to indemnity. 16 Other circumstances sometimes said to demonstrate that
Congress did not intend the employees to be liable are equally inconclusive.
First is the failure of the Government to demand reimbursement from its
employees in the days when relief was granted only through private claim
bills; 17 but only with transfer from Congress to the judiciary of jurisdic-
tion over tort claims was a true legal liability imposed on the United States
which could provide the basis for recovery on the indemnity theory.I
Second is the continuing policy of Congress frequently to allow reimburse-
ment of employees, found by it not to have been seriously negligent, for
losses they suffer due to tort suits against them for injuries inflicted in
the course of employment.' 9 However, insistence by the Government on
the right to indemnity is perfectly consistent with sparing exercise of that
right. Finally, the rarity of reported instances of suit by private employers
2d Sess. 5 (1942), where the following is said in direct reference to these adminis-
trative awards: "It is just and desirable that the burden of redressing wrongs of this
character be assumed by the Government alone, within limits, leaving the employee
at fault to be dealt with under the usual disciplinary controls.' (Italics added.)
See also a comment on the same provision in an appendix to Hearings before
the Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
59 (1942): "It seems proper for the United States alone to bear the onus, within
limits, of damages caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of its employees
acting within the scope of their authority." (Italics added.)
15. The 1942 bills in the House and Senate limited jurisdiction of the courts
to suits not exceeding $7,500 and $10,000 respectively. The Act as passed in 1946
contained no restriction on amount.
The doubt is not resolved by the only other relevant item of the 1942 material,
statements by Assistant Attorney General Shea at the Hearings before the House
Committee. His immediate topic was the provision for administrative handling of
claims, but his language is broad enough to suggest that he did not feel the Govern-
ment had a judicial remedy against the employee for any amounts paid under the
Act. However, it is possible that he meant only that the bill did not establish a
procedure for obtaining reimbursement. Hearings, supra note 14, at 8-10. Note
the contrary view expressed more recently by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
in reporting on a private bill: "Even when a judgment has been obtained on the
Federal Tort Claims Act the United States has a right of action over against the
employee." SEN. REP. No. 2025, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952). This, of course, is
not legislative history for the Tort Claims Act.
16. But see instant case at 848, n.3; Note, 63 YALE L.J. 570, 577 (1954).
17. Brief for Appellant, pp. 17-8; see 40 Ops. ATr'ey GEN. 38 (1941).
18. Had the issue been raised, disbursements before the Act probably would
have been characterized as legislative gratuities, distinct from the payment in satis-
faction of a court-imposed judgment which gives rise to the indemnity right. See
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 112 (1936). On the other hand, a similar conceptual
approach would defeat the argument that the Government, which is liable only by
a legislative waiver, is still a "volunteer."
19. See SEN. REP. No. 2025, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952) which approved
payment on behalf of a government driver of a judgment obtained against him,
and at the same time contained a statement (see note 15 supra) asserting the
Government's right to indemnity in a case where it might choose to demand it.
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against employees 20 is given undue significance unless adequate allowance
is made for the probable high proportion of out-of-court settlements and
low proportion of appeals by employees from adverse lower court decisions.
Thus, close scrutiny must be given to the assumption, adopted in both
this case and the opposing decision of Burks v. United States,2 1 that the
Government is entitled to indemnity on common law principles unless this
is contradicted affirmatively by the Act. A serious challenge to this as-
sumption was presented by the Supreme Court in United States v. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal.22 which refused the United States recovery for loss of
services and expense of medical treatment arising from injury to a soldier
caused by defendant's negligence. Though recognizing the closely analogous
right of a master to recoup equivalent loss occasioned by injury to his
servant, the Court characterized the alleged cause of action as a new one
and declined to exercise creative judicial power to permit recovery, pointing
out the considerations of federal fiscal policy involved and the failure of
Congress to act over many years. The present case may be distinguishable,
since the Standard Oil opinion gives no hint of any contention by the
Government that the status of a soldier was identical to that of an ordinary
employee in relation to the Government. Thus the relief sought in Standard
Oil was treated as demanding extension of a cause of action to a new rela-
tionship, while here the Government asks only that it be allowed, as an
employer, a right already recognized in the employer-employee relation-
ship.23 In direct conflict with Standard Oil is a recent dictum of the
Court expressed in an even more closely related matter also involving an
effect on government finances. In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
2 4
the Court postulated the common law right of the Government to require
contribution from a joint tortfeasor as a premise to sustain its holding
that the Tort Claims Act should be construed to grant a reciprocal right
to sue the United States for contribution.2 Especially significant is the
citation to Moore's Federal Practice 26 which, in analyzing the Standard Oil
case, concluded that the United States is entitled to both contribution and
indemnity, although the right to contribution was considered the more
dubious. It seems impossible to determine conclusively what Congress in-
tended in 1946 or what reconciliation a lower court should make between
Standard Oil and Yellow Cab.
20. A recent Note stated that there seem to be only 6 reported cases since
1900 holding on the employer's right to indemnity. See Note, 63 YALE L.J. 570 n.3
(1954).
21. 116 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
22. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
23. Burks v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 337, 340 (S.D. Tex. 1953).
24. 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
25. However, the right of both parties was conditioned upon approval of contri-
bution in general by the applicable state law. Language of the Standard Oil case
leaves in doubt whether a right to indemnity should be similarly conditioned, if
allowed the Government at all, or a uniform federal rule should be applied. Compare
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 552 (1951), with United States
v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 332 U.S. 301, 308-10 (1947).
26. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 551-2 (1951) ; 3 MOORE,
op. cit. supra note 4, at 507-16.
RECENT CASES
Governmental Immunity-
UNITED STATES HELD NOT LIABLE ON ARMY
POST EXCHANGE EMPLOYEE CONTRACTS
Plaintiff was an accountant with the Army Exchange Service. Payroll
funds in his possession disappeared, and his salary was therefore reduced
by the amount of the loss pursuant to a provision of his contract which
allowed deductions for negligence. In his suit against the United States
to recover the amount deducted, the Court of Claims held that the United
States is not liable under post exchange contracts of employment. Borden
v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 873 (Ct. C1. 1953).1
Although contractors with the United States have the statutory right
to sue the Government on its contracts, 2 the authority of the contracting
agent to bind the United States must be found in a constittltional or statu-
tory provision, usually an appropriation.3  Since by statute no appropriated
funds may be used for post exchanges,4 the system is managed solely with
nonappropriated funds 5 under an army regulation stating that exchange
contracts are not government contracts.6 The court felt bound by this
regulation, by two cases involving an officers' mess 7 and an officers'
club 8  in which the United States was held not liable, and by
Supreme Court dicta that the Government assumes none of the exchanges'
financial obligations.9 The Supreme Court case held that for purposes of
state taxation post exchanges have the War Department's immunities, and
lower courts have declared exchanges immune from state tax and license
acts.10 These situations, however, are distinguishable from the problem of
whether in making a contract a post exchange is an agent of the Govern-
ment or a separate entity. The context of the Supreme Court dicta was a
discussion of the governmental aspects of the exchange system in which
the Court was not passing judgment on the army regulations. Further-
1. After this decision, the exchange service nevertheless reimbursed plaintiff
for his claim. Communication to the UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW RvIEw
from Edward A. Lipton, attorney for the plaintiff, March 26, 1954, on file, Biddle
Law Library, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1952).
3. 12 STAT. 220 (1861), as amended, 41 U.S.C. § 11 (Supp. 1952); Hooe v.
United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910); TANNEY, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT LAW AND
ADmINIsTRATiON 4, 11 (1930) ; Grismore, Contracts with the United States, 22
Mic. L. REv. 749, 752 (1924).
4. 27 STAT. 178 (1892), 10 U.S.C. § 1335 (1946), as amended, 64 STAT. 272
(1950), 10 U.S.C. § 1335 (Supp. 1952).
5. ARmy RF.. 210-50 10a (Nov. 4, 1953).
6. SPECIAL REG. 60-10-1 I2 le (May 12, 1950).
7. Bleur v. United States, Civil No. 2543, E.D.S.C., Dec. 21, 1950.
8. Edelstein v. South Post Officers Club, 118 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Va. 1951). In
the Edelstein case the court's point of United States immunity was dicta; however,
the instant court termed it a holding.
9. Standard Oil Co. of California v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481, 485 (1942).
10. United States v. Query. 37 F. Supp. 972 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd, 121 F.2d 631
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 685 (1941); Falls City Brewing Co. v. Reeves,
40 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Ky. 1941); Dugan v. United States, 34 Ct. Cl. 458 (1899).
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more, the army regulation referred to in the instant case is invalid if incon-
sistent with the statutory right to sue on government contracts.:1 In the
officers' mess case 2 a special statutory provision was said to dictate the
result and in the officers' club case ' the court relied solely on the army
regulation.
Although no cases or statutes state whether exchange employees are
United States employees, the Secretary of the Army, exercising the execu-
tive's authority to make regulations governing the army,14 maintains
complete control over exchange activity.15 The exchange service, an
agency of the Department of the Army, is a part of the nonappropriated
fund program to maintain the well-being of army personnel. 16 Congress
has made appropriations for exchange buildings,11 and passed statutes dis-
posing of exchange funds 18 and affecting the status of exchange employees.19
Regulations govern the hiring and paying 20 of civilian employees. It
seems anomalous that the Secretary of the Army and those under his com-
mand should be acting in a private capacity in carrying out their govern-
11. United States v. Cooke, 336 U.S. 210 (1949); United States v. Symonds,
120 U.S. 46 (1887). See 18 STAT. 337 (1875), 10 U.S.C. § 16 (1946); White v.
United States, 102 F. Supp. 585, 588 (Ct. Cl. 1952); United States v. Webster,
2 Ware 38, 56 (D. Me. 1840).
12. Bleur v. United States, Civil No. 2543, E.D.S.C., Dec. 21, 1950 (officers
could employ civilians only if the officers alone paid them).
13. Edelstein v. South Post Officers Club, 118 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Va. 1951).
14. 18 STAT. 337 (1875), 10 U.S.C. § 16 (1946).
.15. This operation is described generally in Army Reg. 60-10 (May 12, 1950).
Paragraph 34 describes the activities and functions to which exchanges are limited.
Paragraph 40 propounds the accounting procedure, paragraph 41 the budgetary
control, and paragraph 43 the auditing procedure to be employed. The exchange
service also keeps control over the concession contracts. S -mAL. REG. 60-10-1 4
(July 14, 1950). Purchases by each exchange are to be made only on standard
Army and Air Force Exchange Service contracts. SPECIAL REG. 60-10-1 116d
(July 14, 1950).
16. Aimy REG. 210-50 [4 (Nov. 4, 1953).
17. 32 STAT. 937, 938 (1903); 37 STAT. 582 (1912).
18. 47 STAT. 1573 (1933); 48 STAT. 1229 (1934), 31 U.S.C. §7 2 5g (1946).
The Secretary of the Army is authorized to pay civilian employees of the army
hostess and library services out of funds appropriated for the post exchanges. 42
STAT. 1380 (1923), 10 U.S.C. §663 (1946) (see text at note 17 srupra).
19. 64 STAT. 496 (1950), 42 U.S.C. § 410(a) (7) (B) (iv) (Supp. 1952) ; 63
STAT. 956 (1949), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 1082(23) (Supp. 1952); 66 STAT. 138,
139 (1952), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 150k, 150k-1 (Cum. Supp. 1953). House report, H.R.
REP. No. 1995, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), U.S.C. CoNG. AND ADmix. NEWS 1520
(1952), speaks of exchange employees as employees of the Department of the
Army. Id. at 1520. In letters to the House committee, the Assistant Secretary
of Defense and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget also refer to these em-
ployees as Department of Defense employees. Id. at 1522, 1525. The Civil Service
Commission stated that Congress has not settled the issue of whether exchange
employees are federal employees. Id. at 1524. The wording of the statute here
said that only for the purpose of Civil Service and Federal Employee Compensation
Acts exchange employees shall not be held as United States Employees, but a proviso
was carefully added that the act shall not affect the status of the exchanges as federal
instrumentalities.
20. Amsy REG. 60-10 §20a (May 12, 1950).
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mental duties to provide for the army personnel's welfare.2 ' This result
appears indicated, however, because the army secretary may not spend
government money to run post exchanges and has no express statutory
authority to execute exchange employee contracts on behalf of the
Government.
A suit against the Army Exchange Service is a possible alternative,
as a government agency is not immune merely because it is doing the
Government's work.2 The formulated test for determining when sovereign
immunity applies is whether the relief is against the sovereign.p But,
as the instant court stated, such an alternative is faced with the Supreme
Court dicta that exchanges are entitled to all the immunities of the War
Department; 24 and a recent case relied on that dicta in disallowing as
against the sovereign a suit against naval officers serving on a naval gun
factory lunchroom committee.2 Since the nonappropriated fund system is
under the exclusive control of the Secretary of the Army for the army's
welfare program, it is probable that a suit against the exchange service
would be adjudged a suit against the sovereign. Thus, contractors with
the post exchanges may be without a legal remedy until Congress gives
exchanges consent to be sued or legally recognizes exchanges for what they
in fact are: an inseparable essential branch of the United States Army.
Labor-Management Relations Act-
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OF SUITS BY UNION
UNDER SECTION 301(a) DENIED
A labor organization representing defendant's employees sued in a
federal district court, basing its claim of federal jurisdiction solely upon
Section 301(a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act.' Alleging that
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect required
that defendant pay 4000 of its employees their full monthly salaries even
though they were voluntarily absent on one day during the month and
that defendant refused to do so, the association sought a declaration of the
rights of the parties under the agreement and a money judgment in favor
of the individual employees. The district court held that Section 301(a)
21. In the instant case at 877 the court. says: "For the army to contend and to
provide by regulation that it is-not liable since it did not act in its official capacity
would be like a man charged with extra-marital activity pleading that whatever
he may have done was done in his individual capacity and not in his capacity as a
husband."
22. RFC v. Menihan Corp., 312 U.S. 81, 83 (1941); Keifer & Keifer v. RFC,
306 U.S. 381, 388 (1939) ; Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 568 (1922). In most of the Congressionally
formed government corporations, the right to sue the corporation is granted by statute.
Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, supra at 390.
23. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 687 (1949).
24. See instant case at 877.
25. Nimro v. Davis, 204 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See also Edelstein v. South
Post Officers Club, 118 F. Supp. 40 (E.D. Va. 1951).
1. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (Supp. 1952).
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conferred jurisdiction over the subject matter, but dismissed on the merits 2
The circuit court, by a four to three decision, vacated the judgment, holding
that the rights asserted arose not from the collective bargaining agreement
but from the employees' individual contracts of hire, and that consequently
jurisdiction under Section 301 (a) was lacking. Association of Westing-
house Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. 2d 623
(3d Cir., 1954) (Biggs, C. J., Hastie and Kalodner, JJ., dissenting).
Section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act gives the
federal courts jurisdiction over "suits for violation of a contract between
an employer and a labor organization. . . ." 3 Courts have uniformly
recognized that collective bargaining agreements are "contracts" within
the meaning of this section,4 and several courts have, without extensive
discussion, taken jurisdiction over claims indistinguishable from the present
one. These have included claims for damages suffered by employees wrong-
fully discharged, 5 payment of pension benefits to an employee, 6 payment
of wages at rates fixed by the collective bargaining agreement,7 enforce-
ment of an arbitrator's award to an employee made under procedure pre-
scribed by the collective bargaining agreement,8 and vacation 9 and holi-
day 10 pay.
The majority of this court refused to follow these cases and relied on
its own analysis of the genesis of the particular rights which the association
sought to enforce. It viewed the collective bargaining agreement not as
the source of any rights in the individual employee but as a mere estab-
lishment of the terms to which the employer must adhere in making indi-
vidual contracts of hire under the National Labor Relations Act "I and
the decision in J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB. "  Thus the court concluded that
2. 107 F. Supp. 692 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
3. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (Supp. 1952).
4. Legislative history leaves no doubt that collective bargaining agreements were
included in the word "Contract." The original language of the Senate bill reads:
"Suits for violations of contracts concluded as a result of collective bargain-
ing . . . ." 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LAoR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr,
1947 (1948).
5. United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997
(7th Cir. 1952); Bakery and Confectionery Workers v. National Biscuit Co., 177
F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1949); Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113
F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94
F. Supp. 626 (M.D.N.C. 1950).
6. American Federation of Labor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535
(6th Cir. 1950).
7. Food & Service Trades Council v. Retail Associates, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 221
(N.D. Ohio 1953); Local 937 v. Royal Typewriter Co., 88 F. Supp. 669 (D. Conn.
1949); United Shoe Workers v. Le Danne Footwear, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 714 (D.
Mass. 1949).
8. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980 (10th
Cir. 1951).
9. United Automobile Workers v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 18
CCH LAD. CAS. r 65,867 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
10. Local 793, UAW-CIO v. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co., 19 CCH LAB. CAS.
166,162 (D. Mich. 1951).
11. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1946).
12. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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the rights litigated arose solely from the contracts between the employer
and the individual employees. However, since under Case the terms of
a collective bargaining agreement control the conditions of employment
even in the face of contrary provisions in a pre-existing written contract
between employer and employee, the rights of the individual employee
would appear to originate not in the contract of hire but in the collective
bargaining agreement. Although the majority professes to reject the fre-
quently applied contract concepts which treat the result of the collective
bargaining process as the creation of a usage, 13 a contract by the union as
agent of the employee, 14 or as a third party beneficiary contract, 1 its
rationale is little more than a usage theory in which the incorporation of the
usage into the individual contracts is made mandatory under its interpre-
tation of Case. A more realistic view would give legal consequences to
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement by recognizing that
"There is little left to individual agreement except the act of hiring." 16
In addition, in view of the present holding that the union may not
assert the rights of the employee in the federal courts, and prior holdings
that the employee is not a proper party to assert them in his own behalf
under Section 301(a), 17 the existence and enforcement of the employee's
rights are left to state law. The Act is thus placed in the anomalous posi-
tion of having created substantive contract rights 18 of employer and union
13. See e.g., Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Harrison v.
Pullman Co., 68 F.2d 826 (8th Cir. 1934); Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Webb, 64 F.2d
902 (5th Cir. 1933); U.S. Daily Publishing Corp. v. Nichols, 31 F.2d 834 (D.C.
Cir. 1929); 1 TELLER, LABoR DISPUTES AND CouLwrv BARGAINING § 159 (1940);
Warns, The Nature of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 3 MIAMI L.Q. 235
(1948) ; Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in, Anerican Law, 44 HARv. L. REv.
572, 582 (1931).
14. See, e.g., Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 169 Fed. 225 (6th Cir. 1909); Gary v.
Central of Ga. Ry., 44 Ga. App. 120, 160 S.E. 716 (1931); TELLER, Op. Cit. supra
note 13, § 167; Warns, supra note 13, at 237; Rice, supra note 13, at 594.
15. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois Central R.R., 24 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Miss.
1938) ; Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931) ; TELLER,
op. cit. supra note 13, § 168; Warns, supra note 13, at 237. But cf. Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Associated Milk Dealers, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 584, 585 (N.D. Ill.
1941).
16. J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944). See Hoeniger, The In-
dividual Emplonnent Contract under the Wagner Act:I, 10 FoRD. L. REv. 14 (1941).
17. Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949); see
United Protective Workers of America v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.
1952); cf. Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Union, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D.
Ark. 1953). This conclusion is based partly on the Act and partly on an attempt
to avoid the burden of the increase of litigation which might result from a contrary
decision. See Schatte v. International Alliance, supra at 672-3. Even where di-
versity exists between employer and individual employees, the emloyees may not add
their claims for the purpose of reaching the jurisdictional amount. Knudsen v.
Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 106 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. 11. 1952).
18. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1950); Schatte v. International Alliance, 182 F.2d 158, 164 (9th Cir. 1950); see
Note, 57 YALE L.J. 630 (1948). But cf. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers
Int'l Union, 187 F.2d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1951); Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COL. L. Rxv. 157, 186-7 (1953).
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but not of employee. By restricting the application of the section to those
terms which affect the union as a whole, such as check-off, union shop and
arbitration provisions, the majority view leaves many terms of the collective
bargaining agreement unenforceable in the federal courts and is not in ac-
cord with the broad language of the Act.1 9 Uniformity of labor policy in
the interpretation of identical or similar provisions of collective bargaining
agreements, which becomes increasingly important as the collective bar-
gaining process is centralized,2 0 would be impossible if the rights of the
employee were to depend upon conflicting state laws.21  The possibility,
foreseen by the court, that an employee who is inadvertently omitted from
the award in a suit by the union might be barred by the principles of
res judicata cannot justify the holding in the instant case. Suits by an
employee on behalf of himself and others similarly situated on a collective
bargaining agreement,22 and a tort action by a union on behalf of its
members 2 have been characterized as "spurious class suits," 24 in which
a judgment does not bind one who did not participate; 25 nor does Section
301 (b) constitute the union a trustee,26 which binds by res judicata those
whom it represents.27 Moreover, the employee who thinks himself entitled
to recovery is better protected by permitting suit by the union since he can
much more readily make himself known to his representative than institute
proceedings in his own behalf. This case, by denying jurisdiction over
actions brought by the union except in cases in which the union asserts a
provision in the agreement which affects the union as an entity, unjus-
tifiably limits the application of the section and deprives the employee of
an efficient and effective means of securing the benefits of the collective
bargaining agreement.
19. During debate Senator Taft stated that: "The purpose of title III is to give
the employer and the employee the right to go to the Federal courts to bring a suit
to enforce the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement . . ." 93 CONG. REc.
4141 (1947) (italics added). The legislative history of the section is otherwise
unenlightening concerning who may sue and what rights are protected under § 301 (a).
See references to § 301 (a) in LEaSLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT, 1947 (1948).
20. See DAVEY, CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 48-64 (1951).
21. E.g., compare Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Webb, 64 F2d 902 (5th Cir. 1933),
vith Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
22. See, e.g., Knudsen v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 106 F. Supp. 48 (N.D.
Ill. 1952).
23. See, e.g., Rock Drilling Local Union v. Mason & Hangar Co., 90 F. Supp.
539 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
24. 2 MOORz, FEDERAL PRACTICE UNDER THE NEW FEDERAL RULES 2241 (1938).
25. Ibid.; cf. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Industrial Dist. Lodge, 91
F. Supp 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950). But cf. Lyman v. Billy Rose Exposition
Spectacles, Inc., 179 Misc. 512, 39 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
26. See Rock Drilling Local Union v. Mason & Hangar Co., 90 F. Supp. 539,
540 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
27. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 85 (1942).
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Nationality-
POWER OF IMMIGRATION SERVICE TO SUBPOENA
NATURALIZED CITIZENS FOR POSSIBLE
DENATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS
The United States Immigration Service issued subpoenas under
§ 235 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 1 to two natural-
ized citizens, commanding them to appear and give testimony. The sub-
poenaed parties refused to testify, and on application by the Immigration
Service for enforcement, the district court held that the Act does not author-
ize the subpoenaing of naturalized citizens to ascertain good cause for the
institution of proceedings to revoke their citizenship. Application of
Barnes, 116 F. Supp. 464 (N.D.N.Y. 1953).2 In an opinion handed down
five days later by another district court, a similar subpoena was upheld.
In re Minker, 118 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1953).8
The subpoena power of administrative agencies varies depending on
the statute setting up and governing the agency.4 Section 235(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the issuance of subpoenas to
witnesses by the Immigration Service to compel testimony relating to the
privilege of any person to enter or reside in the country.5 An interpreta-
tion of this section necessitates the resolution of two main issues: whether
the subpoena is authorized in proceedings involving expulsion of citizens as
well as in those involving expulsion of aliens and whether the subpoena is
authorized to be issued to parties in interest as well as other witnesses.
1. "The Attorney General and any immigration officer, including special inquiry
officers, shall have power to require by subpena the attendance and testimony of
wztnesses before immigration officers and special inquiry officers and the pro-
duction of books, papers, and documents relating to the privilege of any person
to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States or concerning
any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this Act
and the administration of the Service, and to that end may invoke the aid of
any court of the United States."
66 STAT. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225 (a) (1953) (McCarran-Walter Act) (italics
added). For a comprehensive survey of the Act see Developments in the Law-
Imnigration and Nationality, 66 HARv. L. Rxv. 643 (1953).
2. Followed in In re Oddo, 117 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
3. Only in the Oddo case was the subpoenaed party specifically given notice
that the purpose of the hearing was to obtain information for possible denaturali-
zation proceedings. See In re Oddo, 117 F. Supp. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In the
Minker and Barnes cases, the parties might well have suspected the purpose of the
hearing from the face of the subpoena which commanded them to appear under
§ 235(a) and testify in a matter concerning themselves. In Minker the subpoenaed
party acknowledged that he understood the purpose of the hearing. Minker case at
265. In Barnes the party appeared voluntarily at the written request of the Service
prior to issuance of a subpoena, but refused to testify when the officer would not
reveal the reason for the interview. Barnes case at 465.
4. SEN. Doc. No. 248, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946) (Administrative Procedure
Act).
5. See note 1 supra.
6. A minor issue, substantially resolved by earlier decisions, is whether or not,
since the remainder of §235 (a) deals only with exclusion of persons from the
country, the subpoena provision may be interpreted to apply to proceedings for
expulsion as well. Loufakis v. United States, 81 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1936), held the
subpoena provision in the 1917 Immigration Act applicable to proceedings for ex-
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Section 235 (a) is a reenactment of a similar provision in § 16 of the
Immigration Act of 1917 7 with two significant changes. The word "per-
son" was substituted in the 1952 Act for "alien" in the earlier statute, and
permission was added to subpoena for the purpose of obtaining informa-
tion "concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforce-
ment of this Act and the administration of the Service." Although legis-
lative history sheds no light on the purpose of these changes," the substitu-
tion of "person" for "alien" indicates an intent to broaden the subpoena
power to cover proceedings involving all persons, citizens as well as aliens.9
The location of the subpoena provision in a section of the Act dealing only
with aliens may be explained by the fact that the former section, before
the changes in wording, pertained only to aliens.10 Furthermore the addi-
tion of the clause directing use of the subpoena in obtaining any informa-
tion relevant to enforcement of the Act as a whole indicates an intent to
extend its applicability beyond the subject matter of the specific section
in which it appears. The fact that its major use is in subpoenaing of
aliens probably accounts for its retention in the alien section. However, the
exact compass of the extension of applicability of the subpoena provision is
equivocal. One court," in holding that a naturalized citizen could not be
subpoenaed to appear and give testimony with respect to the validity of
his naturalization, pointed out that a broad construction of the provision
as authorizing use of the subpoena in any instance where it would aid the
administration of the Immigration Service would render redundant
§ 335(b) of the Act, 12 a specific provision for issuance of subpoenas in
prenaturalization proceedings. A more limited construction of the §235 (a)
subpoena provision to extend the authorized use of the subpoena only to
instances where it would aid the administration of the Service and also
pulsion of an alien. See note 7 infra. That provision did not apply to citizens, but
an extension of the provision in the 1952 Act to cover citizens would necessitate an
extension of applicability of the subpoena provision to denaturalization proceedings,
which are the first step in expulsion of a citizen.
7. "Any commissioner of immigration or inspector in charge shall have power
to require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses before said in-
spectors and the production of books, papers, aid documents touching the right of
any alien to enter, reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States, and to that
end may invoke the aid of any court of the United States ... " 39 STAT. 886
(1917) (italics added).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1952); SEN. REP. No. 1137,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1952).
9. In its use elsewhere in the same section, "person" is not confined in meaning
to aliens alone. "Any person coming into the United States may be required to
state under oath . . .whether he intends to become a citizen thereof, and such
other items of information as will aid the immigration officer in determining whether
he is a national of the United States or an alien ... " 66 STAT. 198 (1952), 8
U.S.C.A. §1225(a) (1953).
10. The court in the Barnes case felt that since the subpoena provision appears
in a section dealing with aliens, it was meant to apply only to aliens. Barnes
case at 466.
11. See In re Oddo, 117 F. Supp. 323, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
12. See note 18 infra.
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relate to the privilege of any person to enter or remain in the country
would obviate the redundancy. 13
Whether § 235 (a) was meant to authorize the subpoenaing of parties
in interest as well as other witnesses is an issue less easily resolved. 14 The
language of the statute is that immigration officers may subpoena "wit-
nesses," but courts, in deciding whether or not this term as used in other
statutes includes the parties themselves, have divided, depending on the
context. 15 Cases which enforced subpoenas issued under the 1917 Act to
alien parties in interest 1e are inconclusive, since the precise issue was not
litigated. Congress has used the word "witnesses" in other Acts in de-
noting those subject to the power of subpoena where, because of the nature
of the investigations conducted under those Acts, the intent was obviously
to compel the giving of information by parties in interest as well as
others.' 7 But the specific designation in the prenaturalization subpoena
provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the term "witnesses"
as "including petitioner" 18 might be indicative of an intent that, where no
13. Since prenaturalization proceedings do not relate to the privilege of the
person seeking naturalization to enter or remain in the country, they would not be
covered by the § 235(a) subpoena provision under this construction. Denaturaliza-
tion proceedings such as those contemplated in the Barnes, Minker and Oddo cases,
on the other hand, would be covered since they are the first step in deportation pro-
ceedings and therefore relate to the privilege of the person to remain in the country.
This limited construction of the subpoena provision would, of course, be contrary to
a literal reading of the statute, which says "or concerning any matter which is ma-
terial and relevant to the enforcement of this Act or the administration of the
Service." (italics added). But to give full scope to these words is to deny any
meaning to the preceding words, "relating to the privilege of any person to enter,
reenter, reside in, or pass through the United States," since any information so re-
lating would most certainly also be encompassed by the broader provision.
14. The chief contention of the petitioner in the Minker case was that the
word "witnesses" in § 235 (a) was not used to include the parties themselves.
15. "Witnesses" includes parties: Klein v. Keresey, 307 Mass. 51, 29 N.E.2d
703 (1940) (statute allowed impeaching testimony of own "witnesses") ; Murphy v.
Sullivan, 77 N.Y.S. 950 (Monroe County Ct. 1901) (statute authorized taking
depositions of "witnesses").
'Witnesses" does not include parties: Ahern v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App.
2d 27, 245 P.2d 568 (1952) (statute authorized taking deposition of one who is the
only "witness" who can establish a fact material to the issue) ; Hubbard v. Haynes,
189 Tenn. (25 Beeler) 335, 225 S.W.2d 252 (1949) (statute passed before parties
of record were competent as witnesses authorized taking depositions of "witnesses").
Said the Tennessee court, ". . . it is evident that the question whether the word
'witnesses' includes 'parties,' is to be determined in each case by the attendant cir-
cumstances and context, and that there is no safe general rule that can be applied
universally." Id. at 338, 225 S.W.2d at 253.
16. See Loufakis v. United States, 81 F.2d 966 (3d Cir. 1936); United States
v. Parson, 22 F. Supp. 149 (S.D Cal.), rev'd m other grounds stb norn. Graham
v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938).
17. See 15 U.S.C. §49 (1946) (Federal Trade Commission Act); 52 STAT.
1065 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1946) (Fair Labor Standards Act); 61 STAT. 150
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1) (Supp. 1951) (Labor Management Relations Act).
18. "The Attorney General shall designate employees of the Service to conduct
preliminary examinations upon petitions for naturalization to any naturalization
court and to make recommendations thereon to such court. For such purposes any
such employee so designated is authorized to . . . require by subpoena the attend-
ance and testimony of witnesses, including petitioner .... " 66 STAT. 255 (1952), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1446(b) (1953) (italics added).
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such specific designation is made, the term shall not include the interested
party.
Any interpretation of § 235 (a) on either basic issue requires a con-
sideration of § 340,19 which prescribes a specific procedure for judicial
revocation of citizenship. The Barnes case held that this precluded an
administrative examination in connection therewith.2 But § 340 directs
that the judicial proceeding shall be initiated only upon an affidavit show-
ing good cause, and an examination by the Immigration Service under sub-
poena would facilitate the preparation of this affidavit.2 1 On the other
hand, since § 340 also protects defendants from having to meet the
charges of the Government without sixty days' personal notice,22 subject-
ing defendants to a compulsory hearing before the sixty-day period weakens
this protection by forcing immediate disclosure of information which can
be used against them at trial 23 before their counsel has had adequate time
in which to prepare a defense. The danger to the defendant is heightened
by the fact that since a proceeding to revoke citizenship is not a criminal
action 24 the defendant cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion on the ground that his testimony might lead to revocation.25  Some
measure of protection could be preserved by a requirement that the sub-
poenaed party be furnished with a copy of the questions to be asked in ad-
vance of the hearing, with time for counsel to study them beforehand.
However, the ultimate interpretation of "witnesses" in § 235 (a) must de-
pend upon a weighing of the value of forcing a full disclosure of relevant
information to facilitate the operation of the statutory exclusion, deporta-
tion and denaturalization procedures, against the value of protecting the
persons being investigated from having to disclose what information they
possess.
19. 66 STAT. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C.A. 1451 (1953) provides:
"(a) It shall be the duty of the United States district attorneys for the re-
spective districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute pro-
ceedings in . . . court . . .for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the
order admitting . . . [a] person to citizenship and canceling the certificate of
naturalization on the ground that such order and certificate of naturalization
were procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresenta-
tion ....
"(b) The party to whom was granted the naturalization alleged to have
been procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation
shall, in any such proceedings under subsection (a) of this section, have sixty
days' personal notice, unless waived by such party, in which to make answers
to the petition of the United States ... "
20. Barnes case at 469.
21. See 8 CODE FED. REGs. § 340.11. This would be a use of the subpoena
"relevant to the enforcement of this Act" as provided for in § 235(a). See also
DAvis, ADmNisTRAiaTv LAW 103 (1951).
22. See note 19 supra.
23. The information would be admissible in evidence at trial as an admission.
4 Wz umom, EVIDENCE § 1048 (3d ed. 1940). Cf. United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 (D. Mass. 1950) (information obtained by sub-
poena held admissible against defendant in a civil antitrust suit).
24. Klapprott v. United States, 166 F.2d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 1948), rev'd on
other grounds, 335 U.S. 601, judgment amended, 336 U.S. 942, motion for clarifica-
tion denied, 336 U.S. 949 (1949).
25. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2254 (3d Ed. 1940).
